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OPS dnsop This document retires the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") and GOST R 34.11-94 within DNSSEC. RFC 5933 (Historic) defined the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms with DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This document updates RFC 5933 by deprecating the use of ECC-GOST.

Introduction The GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms are documented in and their use with DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is further described in . These two algorithms were deprecated by the Orders of the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology of Russia (Rosstandart) in August 2012 and were superseded by GOST 34.10-2012 and GOST 34.11-2012, respectively. The use of these two newer algorithms in DNSSEC is documented in , and their associated requirement levels are not changed by this document. Thus, the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") and GOST R 34.11-94 is no longer recommended for use in DNSSEC .

Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Deprecating ECC-GOST Algorithms in DNSSEC The GOST R 34.11-94 algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating Delegation Signer (DS) records. Validating resolvers MUST treat GOST R 34.11-94 DS records as insecure. If no other DS records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the DNS records below the delegation point MUST be treated as insecure. The GOST R 34.10-2001 algorithm (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") MUST NOT be used when creating DNS Public Key (DNSKEY) and Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) records. Validating resolvers MUST treat RRSIG records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as unsupported algorithms. If no other RRSIG records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the validating resolver MUST consider the associated resource records as insecure.

Security Considerations This document potentially increases the security of the DNSSEC ecosystem by deprecating algorithms that are no longer recommended for use.

Operational Considerations This document removes support for ECC-GOST. Zone operators currently making use of ECC-GOST-based algorithms should switch to algorithms that remain supported. DNS registries should prohibit their clients from uploading and publishing ECC-GOST-based DS records to ensure that they are using algorithms that are supported by DNSSEC validators and thus can be DNSSEC validated.

IANA Considerations IANA has updated the GOST R 34.10-2001 (12) entry in the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry as follows:

Number:

12

Description:

GOST R 34.10-2001 (DEPRECATED)

Mnemonic:

ECC-GOST

Zone Signing:

Y

Trans. Sec.:

*

Use for DNSSEC Signing:

MUST NOT

Use for DNSSEC Validation:

MUST NOT

Implement for DNSSEC Signing:

MUST NOT

Implement for DNSSEC Validation:

MUST NOT

Reference:

, Change the status of GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSSEC in the IETF stream to Historic, and RFC 9906

Note: The "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation" columns were already set to MUST NOT. IANA has updated the GOST R 34.11-94 (3) entry in the "Digest Algorithms" registry as follows:

Value:

3

Description:

GOST R 34.11-94 (DEPRECATED)

Use for DNSSEC Delegation:

MUST NOT

Use for DNSSEC Validation:

MUST NOT

Implement for DNSSEC Delegation:

MUST NOT

Implement for DNSSEC Validation:

MUST NOT

Reference:

, Change the status of GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSSEC in the IETF stream to Historic, and RFC 9906

Note: The "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation" columns were already set to MUST NOT.

References Normative References IANA IANA USC/ISI Google Informative References

Acknowledgments The authors appreciate the comments and suggestions from the following IETF participants in helping produce this document: , , , , , , , , , , , , , and the many members of the DNSOP Working Group that discussed this specification.