]> Tsinghua University

xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn

Tsinghua University

wangxiaoliang0623@foxmail.com

Tsinghua University

zhuotaoliu@tsinghua.edu.cn

Tsinghua University

qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn

Zhongguancun Laboratory

guoyangfei@zgclab.edu.cn

Secure Inter-Domain Routing BGPsec inter-domain routing This document elaborates on the reasons why it is unfeasible to reconstruct the native-BGPsec as a transitive approach, such that a BGP update with a correctly signed BGPsec_PATH attribute can traverse legacy areas and afterwards it can still be properly processed by subsequent native-BGPsec speakers. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is vulnerable to route leaks and hijacking attacks. Native BGPsec, as defined in , extends BGP to enhance the security of AS path information. Nevertheless, native BGPsec encounters challenges in achieving incremental deployment. It utilizes an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute to deliver digital signatures. Yet, when BGPsec messages traverse BGPsec-unemployed, the last BGPsec-aware router falls back to native BGP protocol to ensure backward compatibility, by completely removing the BGPsec-related path attribute (i.e., the BGPsec_PATH attribute). The principal objectives are to make BGPsec transit transparently over BGPsec-unemployed areas, instead of completely falling back to legacy BGP. In order to transit across areas where BGPsec has not been deployed, the most straightforward approach is to transform the native BGPsec into transitive BGPsec. However, this document will illustrate that it is unfeasible to render BGPsec as a transitive approach for traversing undeployed areas while still being compatible with native BGPsec. In other words, transitive BGPsec is not compatible with BGPsec.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

BGP:

BGP, native BGP, and/or legacy BGP are the BGP version 4 defined in and/or multiprotocol BGP defined in . It does not support BGPsec or native BGPsec.

BGPsec:

BGPsec, native BGPsec, and/or traditional BGPsec are the BGPsec approach defined in .

T-BGPsec:

T-BGPsec or transitive BGPsec means that the transitive BGPsec approach is defined in this document.

Transitive BGPsec Modifications Transitive BGPsec, in essence, describes that the BGPsec_PATh must be transitive and compliant with native BGPsec.

Transitive BGPsec Negotiation As stated in , for a BGPsec router to successfully negotiate with its peer, it must transmit the BGPsec Capabilities that are in accordance with those of its peers in the BGP OPEN message. A transitive path attribute, instead, does not require the negotiation of capabilities with peers. In the event that a peer fails to comprehend the transitive path attribute, it simply forwards it to downstream BGP speakers. In transitive BGPsec, negotiating the BGPsec capability is not required. However, a BGPsec router is obligated to inform its peer that it supports transitive BGPsec. In this case, the reuse of the BGPsec capability is essential. Nevertheless, there is no requirement to utilize the Dir field and the AFI field. Transitive BGPsec reuses the native BGPsec capability format. Consequently, the version field of the BGPsec capability must be updated to 1, while the remaining fields should be filled with 0. If a BGPsec router negotiates with its peers and the version value of the BGPsec capability is set to 1, this implies that the router supports transitive BGPsec. In this scenario, the BGPsec capability serves two purposes. Firstly, it notifies the peer that this particular BGP speaker is capable of supporting transitive BGPsec. Secondly, it differentiates transitive BGPsec from native BGPsec. For the sake of compatibility, this document designates that it still supports native BGPsec in this version.

The Transitive BGPsec_PATH Attribute Given that the objective is to expedite the incremental deployment of BGPsec, this document considers the least possible modifications to BGPsec. Consequently, all of the packet formats of the BGPsec_PATH attribute defined in are reutilized in the establishment of transitive BGPsec, including the BGPsec_PATH attribute format, Secure_Path format, Secure_Path Segment format, Signature_Block format, and Signature_Block Segment format. In native BGPsec, the BGPsec_PATH attribute is an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute. However, within this document, the BGPsec_PATH attribute is defined as an optional transitive BGP path attribute. It is important to note that the attribute code should remain the same as that of the native BGPsec_PATH attribute.

Updating and Receiving BGP UPDATE message TBD.

Question: Compatibility with Native BGPsec Taking the topology presented in as an example:

• AS A, AS B, and AS C are regions with continuous native BGPsec deployments. Specifically, AS A, AS B, and AS C implement native BGPsec. Additionally, AS C also implements transitive BGPsec.
• AS D and AS E are areas with legacy BGP deployments. These areas do not implement native BGPsec, transitive BGPsec, or any other related security mechanisms.
• AS F deploys native BGPsec.

Example: Mix Deployment Scenario | B | --> | C | --> | D | --> | E | --> | F | --> ... +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ | | | | | | | | | | \ / \ / | BGPsec Continuous Area Non-BGPsec Area BGPsec ]]>

AS A is capable of negotiating the BGPsec Capability with AS B. AS A disseminates a route prefix through a BGPsec UPDATE message to AS B. AS B can negotiate the BGPsec Capability independently with both AS A and AS C. It receives the BGPsec UPDATE message from AS A and validates it in accordance with the BGPsec specification. Subsequently, it modifies the BGPsec UPDATE message by incorporating its own information and forwards it to AS C. AS C obtains the BGPsec UPDATE message from AS B. AS C validates the BGPsec UPDATE message and makes the necessary modifications. In this scenario, because AS D is a legacy AS, AS C converts this message into a transitive BGPsec UPDATE message. AS D and AS E refrain from processing this transitive BGPsec message and instead forward it to the subsequent hop. AS F receives this transitive BGPsec UPDATE message from AS E. Because AS F deploys the native BGPsec, it will conduct a syntax check. However, the verification will fail because the message is not correctly formatted as a BGPsec UPDATE message. In summary, any native BGPsec speaker on the downstream of an undeployed region cannot properly process the transitive BGPsec UPDATE messages sent by upstream ASes. Thus, we conclude that the transitive BGPsec is not a viable option to make BGPsec incrementally deployable. A new intermediate protocol is required in the transition to full BGPsec deployment.

Explainations Why we persistently on making a transitive BGP path security mechanism is that we would like to make the new one can achieve more benefit for the whole network, not just making some BGPsec islands.

Security Considerations There are no security considerations in this document.

IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions.

References Normative References This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol. The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced. BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths. This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines extensions to BGP-4 to enable it to carry routing information for multiple Network Layer protocols (e.g., IPv6, IPX, L3VPN, etc.). The extensions are backward compatible - a router that supports the extensions can interoperate with a router that doesn't support the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of Autonomous Systems (ASes) through which a BGP UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that carries digital signatures produced by each AS that propagates the UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route. BCP 172 (i.e., RFC 6472) recommends not using AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET AS_PATH segment types in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This document advances that recommendation to a standards requirement in BGP; it prohibits the use of the AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET path segment types in the AS_PATH. This is done to simplify the design and implementation of BGP and to make the semantics of the originator of a BGP route clearer. This will also simplify the design, implementation, and deployment of various BGP security mechanisms. This document updates RFC 4271 by deprecating the origination of BGP routes with AS_SET (Type 1 AS_PATH segment) and updates RFC 5065 by deprecating the origination of BGP routes with AS_CONFED_SET (Type 4 AS_PATH segment). Finally, it obsoletes RFC 6472. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References This document captures the design rationale of the initial draft version of what became RFC 8205 (the BGPsec protocol specification). The designers needed to balance many competing factors, and this document lists the decisions that were made in favor of or against each design choice. This document also presents brief summaries of the arguments that aided the decision process. Where appropriate, this document also provides brief notes on design decisions that changed as the specification was reviewed and updated by the IETF SIDR Working Group and that resulted in RFC 8205. These notes highlight the differences and provide pointers to details and rationale regarding those design changes.

Acknowledgments TODO acknowledge.