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<rfc category="info" docName="draft-si-saag-zerotrust-promblem-00"
     ipr="trust200902">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Zero Trust Deployment Problem Statement">Problem Statement
    of Zero Trust Deployment in Telecom Network Environments</title>

    <author fullname="Xuan Si" initials="X" surname="Si">
      <organization>China Telecom</organization>

      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Kangqiao Town, Pudong New District</street>

          <city>Shanghai</city>

          <region/>

          <code>201315</code>

          <country>China</country>
        </postal>

        <email>six1@chinatelecom.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date day="23" month="December" year="2025"/>

    <abstract>
      <t>Zero Trust, as a security paradigm, has achieved global practical
      consensus. However, its large-scale deployment in telecommunications
      network environments presents unique challenges. Operationally standards
      tailored to the specific requirements of telecom networks are
      needed.</t>
    </abstract>

    <note title="Requirements Language">
      <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
      "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
      document are to be interpreted as described in "RFC2119"
      when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
    </note>
  </front>

  <middle>
    <section title="Introduction">
      <t>As a critical security paradigm addressing the limitations of
      traditional "perimeter-based security models," the concepts of Zero
      Trust and continuous dynamic trust have achieved widespread practical
      consensus. However, diverse industry sectors exhibit distinct business
      characteristics and network environments, leading to significant
      variations in Zero Trust implementation pathways and technical emphases:
      some scenarios prioritize fine-grained access control, others focus on
      network cloaking and attack surface reduction, while certain approaches
      emphasize continuous risk assessment.</t>

      <t>To effectively realize dynamic trust solutions, the following
      considerations must be addressed:</t>

      <t>1) How to mitigate bandwidth demands and latency constraints imposed
      by continuous validation mechanisms within Zero Trust architectures on
      communication processes.</t>

      <t>2) How to accurately assess trust levels between different
      entities.</t>

      <t>3) How to upgrade trust mechanisms for existing network architectures
      while minimizing migration costs.</t>
    </section>

    <section title="Existing Mechanisms">
      <t>Current Zero Trust standards such as ITU-T X.1011 and NIST SP 800-207
      provide directional guidance primarily from governance frameworks and
      architectural principles perspectives. The former emphasizes maturity
      models and organizational processes for Zero Trust, while the latter
      focuses on the logical division of component roles. Neither standard
      specifically addresses the practical deployment scenarios of
      telecommunications cloud networks, resulting in a lack of standardized
      references for operators to balance security requirements with business
      continuity. These gaps directly hinder the large-scale advancement of
      Zero Trust in telecommunications cloud network environments. </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Gap Analysis">
      <t>Significant disparities exist between existing frameworks and
      engineering practices in the actual deployment of operator
      telecommunications networks. </t>

      <t>1) Regarding the balance between continuous validation and
      communication efficiency, operator networks must support
      ultra-large-scale concurrent connections and low-latency sensitive
      services. While existing standards emphasize the necessity of
      "continuous validation," they fail to establish quantitative constraints
      on critical technical parameters such as validation frequency, session
      persistence mechanisms, and incremental state synchronization. This
      leads to potential issues in practice, including significant bandwidth
      redundancy, cumulative handshake latency, and state management overhead,
      which adversely impact the real-time performance of core services and
      user experience. The absence of clear baselines for
      "performance-security" trade-offs makes it challenging for operators to
      meet telecommunications-grade SLA requirements while ensuring security.
      </t>

      <t>2) In terms of precise trust level assessment and cross-domain
      interoperability, operator services involve multiple entity types and
      contextual scenarios, requiring trust decisions to integrate dynamic
      attributes such as device fingerprints, behavioral baselines, and
      environmental risks. Although existing standards enumerate dimensions
      like "user identity, device status, and network environment," they do
      not define the minimal necessary attribute sets, weight distribution
      rules, or cross-domain standardized expression methods. This results in
      non-comparable trust scores across different entities and non-reusable
      cross-domain policies, thereby obstructing trust result mutual
      recognition and federated collaboration, and creating a lack of
      anchoring points for constructing globally consistent dynamic trust
      systems. </t>

      <t>3) while existing standards encourage "phased implementation," they
      neither define collaborative models with traditional security
      technologies nor provide specific guidance for upgrade deployments,
      making it difficult to identify feasible paths that simultaneously
      address security requirements and business continuity. </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Problem Statement">
      <t>The primary challenges in current telecommunications network dynamic
      trust scenarios include:</t>

      <t>1) Communication Efficiency and Continuous Validation Balance:
      Reliance on continuous validation mechanisms for multidimensional
      attributes such as user identity, device status, and environmental
      context. However, in operator-grade networks or high-real-time service
      scenarios, frequent identity re-authentication, policy negotiation, or
      encryption handshakes may introduce significant bandwidth overhead and
      end-to-end latency. </t>

      <t>2) Standardization of Dynamic Trust Assessment: Evaluation dimensions
      and calculation models for trust levels of different entities lack
      unified definitions. This disparity hinders cross-domain trust transfer
      implementation and obstructs integration between Zero Trust and existing
      identity/attribute standardization components. </t>

      <t>3) Gradual Trust Upgrade: Telecommunications infrastructure exhibits
      multi-layer heterogeneity with long life cycles, where comprehensive
      security migration incurs extremely high costs and may even pose
      business continuity risks. Solutions must consider achieving transition
      to "dynamic trust models" through standardized interfaces, compatibility
      protocols, and layered deployment strategies, while minimizing
      modifications to existing network topologies. </t>

      <t>Addressing these challenges is essential to further extend trust
      mechanisms across network architectures and ensure network security.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Requirements">
      <t>To ensure the interoperability, scalability, and economic feasibility
      of Zero Trust technologies, coordinated standardization efforts for key
      Zero Trust components must be advanced. </t>

      <t>Communication Efficiency Optimization: Define low-overhead protocols
      supporting continuous validation; </t>

      <t>Trust Assessment Standardization: Discuss universal measurement rules
      for cross-domain trust levels; </t>

      <t>Guidelines: Propose compatibility specifications between existing
      network architectures and Zero Trust models. </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Security Considerations">
      <t>This information document introduces no any extra security problem to
      the Internet.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
      <t>None</t>
    </section>
  </middle>

  <back/>
</rfc>
