Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Internet Key Exchange, or IKEv2 [RFC7296], is a key agreement and security negotiation protocol; it is used for key establishment in IPsec. In the initial set of exchanges, both parties independently select and use their preferred authentication method, which may even differ between the initiator and the responder. In IKEv2, it occurs in the exchange called IKE_AUTH. One option for the authentication method is digital signatures using public key cryptography. Currently, traditional digital signatures are defined for use within IKE_AUTH: RSA signatures, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and ECDSA.¶

The presence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) would render state-of-the-art traditional public-key algorithms obsolete and insecure. This is because the assumptions about the intractability of the mathematical problems these algorithms rely on, which offer confident levels of security today, no longer apply in the presence of a CRQC. Consequently, there is a requirement to update protocols and infrastructure to use post-quantum algorithms. Post-quantum algorithms are public-key algorithms designed to be secure against CRQCs as well as classical computers. The traditional cryptographic primitives that need to be replaced by PQC algorithms are discussed in [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers].¶

Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) [FIPS204] and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) [FIPS205] are quantum-resistant digital signature schemes standardized by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC project. This document specifies the use of the ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms in IKEv2.¶

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]. For the purposes of this document, it is helpful to be able to divide cryptographic algorithms into two classes:¶

"Asymmetric Traditional Cryptographic Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based on integer factorisation, finite field discrete logarithms or elliptic curve discrete logarithms, elliptic curve discrete logarithms, or related mathematical problems.¶

"Post-Quantum Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that is believed to be secure against attacks using quantum computers as well as classical computers. Post-quantum algorithms can also be called quantum-resistant or quantum-safe algorithms. Examples of quantum-resistant digital signature schemes include ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.¶

3. Specifying ML-DSA within IKEv2

ML-DSA [FIPS204] is a digital signature algorithm (part of the CRYSTALS suite) based on the hardness lattice problems over module lattices (i.e., the Module Learning with Errors problem (MLWE)). The design of the algorithm is based on the "Fiat-Shamir with Aborts" [Lyu09] framework introduced by Lyubashevsky, that leverages rejection sampling to render lattice based FS schemes compact and secure. ML-DSA uses uniform distribution over small integers for computing coefficients in error vectors, which makes the scheme easier to implement.¶

ML-DSA is instantiated with 3 parameter sets for the security categories 2, 3 and 5. Security properties of ML-DSA are discussed in Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]. This document specifies the use of the ML-DSA algorithm in IKEv2 at three security levels: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87.¶

ML-DSA offers both deterministic and randomized signing. By default ML-DSA signatures are non-deterministic, the private random seed rho' is pseudorandomly derived from the signer’s private key, the message, and a 256-bit string, rnd - where rnd should be generated by an approved Random Bit Generator (RBG). In the deterministic version, rnd is instead a 256-bit constant string. In the context of signature-based authentication in IKEv2, the composition of the data used for generating a digital signature is unique for each IKEv2 session. This uniqueness arises because the data used for signature creation includes session-specific information such as nonces, cryptographic parameters, and identifiers. If ML-DSA is used as an authentication method within the IKEv2 protocol, the deterministic version of ML-DSA MUST be used.¶

IKEv2 can use arbitrary signature algorithms as described in [RFC7427]. The "Digital Signature" authentication method, as defined in [RFC7427], supersedes previously defined signature authentication methods. In this case, the three security levels of ML-DSA are identified via AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, as specified in [I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]. [RFC7427] defines the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification where each side of the IKE negotiation lists its supported hash algorithms. However, in the case of ML-DSA, it internally incorporates the necessary hash operation as part of its signing algorithm. ML-DSA directly takes the original message, applies a hash function to it internally, and then uses the resulting hash value for the signature generation process. In order to signal within IKE that no pre-hashing needs to be done with ML-DSA, the "Identity" (5) value defined in [RFC8420] MUST be set in the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification to indicate that pre-hashing is not required.¶

4. Specifying SLH-DSA within IKEv2

SLH-DSA [FIPS205] utilizes the concept of stateless hash-based signatures. In contrast to stateful signature algorithms, SLH-DSA eliminates the need for maintaining state information during the signing process. SLH-DSA is designed to sign up to 2^64 messages and it offers three security levels. The parameters for each of the security levels were chosen to provide 128 bits of security, 192 bits of security, and 256 bits of security. This document specifies the use of the SLH-DSA algorithm in IKEv2 at three security levels. It includes the small (S) or fast (F) versions of the algorithm and allows for the use of either SHA-256 [FIPS180] or SHAKE256 [FIPS202] as the hash function. The small version prioritizes smaller signature sizes, making them suitable for resource-constrained environments IoT devices. Conversely, the fast version prioritizes speed over signature size, minimizing the time required to generate and verify signatures. On the other hand, ML-DSA outperforms SLH-DSA in both signature generation and validation time, as well as signature size. SLH-DSA, in contrast, offers smaller key sizes but larger signature sizes.¶

The following combinations are defined:¶

• SLH-DSA-128S-SHAKE¶

• SLH-DSA-128F-SHAKE¶

• SLH-DSA-128S-SHA2¶

• SLH-DSA-128F-SHA2¶

• SLH-DSA-192S-SHAKE¶

• SLH-DSA-192F-SHAKE¶

• SLH-DSA-256S-SHAKE¶

• SLH-DSA-256F-SHAKE¶

SLH-DSA does not introduce a new hardness assumption beyond those inherent to the underlying hash functions. It builds upon established foundations in cryptography, making it a reliable and robust digital signature scheme for a post-quantum world. While attacks on lattice-based schemes like ML-DSA can compromise their security, SLH-DSA will remain unaffected by these attacks due to its distinct mathematical foundations. This ensures the continued security of systems and protocols that utilize SLH-DSA for digital signatures.¶

SLH-DSA offers both deterministic and randomized signing, depending on whether opt_rand is set to a fixed value or a random value. If opt_rand is set to a public seed (an element in the public key), then signing will be deterministic — signing the same message twice will result in the same signature. If SLH-DSA is used as an authentication method within the IKEv2 protocol, the deterministic version of SLH-DSA MUST be used.¶

IKEv2 can use arbitrary signature algorithms as described in [RFC7427]. The "Digital Signature" authentication method, as defined in [RFC7427], supersedes previously defined signature authentication methods. In this case, the different combinations of SLH-DSA are identified via AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, as specified in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus]. In case of SLH-DSA, it internally performs randomized message compression using a keyed hash function that can process arbitrary length messages. In order to signal within IKE that no pre-hashing needs to be done with SLH-DSA, the "Identity" (5) value defined in [RFC8420] MUST be set in the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification to indicate that pre-hashing is not required.¶

5. Mechanisms for Signaling Supported Key Pair Types

The following mechanisms can be used by peers to signal the types of public/private key pairs they possess:¶

• One method to ascertain that the key pair type the initiator wants the responder to use is through a Certificate Request payload sent by the initiator. For example, the initiator could indicate in the Certificate Request payload that it trusts a certificate authority certificate signed by an ML-DSA or SLH-DSA key. This indication implies that the initiator can process ML-DSA or SLH-DSA signatures, which means that the responder can use ML-DSA or SLH-DSA keys when authenticating.¶

• Another method is to leverage [I-D.draft-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce] that allows peers to announce their supported authentication methods. It improves interoperability when IKEv2 partners are configured with multiple credentials of different type to authenticate each other. The responder includes a SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response message containing the PQC digital signature scheme(s) it supports. The initiator includes the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in either the IKE_AUTH request message or in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE request. This notification lists the PQC digital signature scheme(s) supported by the initiator, ordered by preference.¶

6. Security Considerations

ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are modeled under existentially unforgeable digital signatures with respect to an adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA).¶

ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 are designed to offer security comparable with the SHA-256/SHA3-256, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Similarly, SLH-DSA-128{S,F}-{SHA2,SHAKE}, SLH-DSA-192{S,F}-SHAKE, and SLH-DSA-256{S,F}-SHAKE are designed to offer security comparable with the AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively.¶

The Security Considerations section of [I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates] and [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus] applies to this specification as well.¶

Acknowledgements

TODO¶

Authors' Addresses